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Abstract
Whereas existing research posits that the presence of female fighters in armed
groups decreases their propensity for wartime rape, one recent study tests this
claim quantitatively and is unable to detect a statistically significant effect. This leads
the author to conclude that female combatants do not decrease rape. Using that
study’s original data, this article reexamines the evidence for the relationship
between female rebel combatants and wartime sexual violence. Replications of the
original models suggest that they make strong functional form assumptions regarding
numerous independent variables and time dependence and that relaxing them
results in substantively different findings. Namely, women’s participation in armed
groups decreases groups’ use of wartime rape. In support of Loken’s organizational
theory of rape, results also suggest that this effect is moderated by group norms.
These findings contribute to the literature on female participation in rebel groups
and beyond.
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Recent research has begun to consider the structural and strategic determinants of
women participating as fighters in armed intrastate conflict (Henshaw, 2016;
Thomas & Bond, 2015; Thomas & Wood, 2018; R. M. Wood & Thomas, 2017).
At the same time, studies begin to examine the effects such participation has on the
dynamics of armed conflict. Most prominently,1 Loken (2017) extends Cohen
(2013a) and presents evidence that contrary to qualitative studies and common
expectations (E. J. Wood, 2006, 2009), female combatants do not decrease the
prevalence of wartime rape. She argues instead that armed groups’ violence is driven
by organizational features such as military culture and that individuals conform to
this culture irrespective of their personal identities.
These conclusions are noteworthy as they challenge prominent existing work on
the interplay of military organizations’ recruitment and their goals, norms, and
behaviors. If armed group’s organizational culture can indeed neutralize the effects
of combatants’ personal characteristics, it is surprising that these groups would
invest in screening mechanisms to filter out low-quality recruits (Forney, 2015) and
recruit child soldiers whose main benefit appears to be their malleability (Beber &
Blattman, 2013) or that within the same organization, combatants’ behavior system-
atically differs based on their social background or how they entered that organiza-
tion (McLauchlin, 2015). And while Loken (2017) is correct to point out that
existing studies “prioritize organizational explanations for civilian [victimization],
arguing that organizational factors drive behavior and group decision-making” (p.
84), these organizational factors are often linked to violence via fighter character-
istics or group constituencies. For instance, Weinstein (2005, 2007) suggests that
materially endowed rebels are more likely to abuse civilians because their endow-
ments attract opportunistic recruits with little commitment to organizational goals.
Similarly, group goals may drive whether and which civilians are targeted or spared
(Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Fjelde & Hultman, 2014), but recent work shows that
these goals themselves are affected by group’s strategic pressures to mobilize and
retain support (Tokdemir et al., 2020). If groups seek to recruit women due to these
pressures (Thomas & Bond, 2015), they should hence adapt their goals and behavior
accordingly. For instance, women’s active participation in the Eritrean secessionist
movement led to women’s rights becoming a relevant point of debate and, ulti-
mately, core element of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front’s goals (Thomas &
Bond, 2015). Otherwise, disillusioned members may leave the organization or even
switch to rival groups (Oppenheim et al., 2015). As such, there is a theoretical
foundation to expect that armed groups where women fight have more
gender-equal goals, less misogynistic socialization practices, and stronger norms
against sexual violence, resulting in less wartime rape (see E. J. Wood, 2009).
This article takes these insights as motivation to replicate and extend Loken’s
statistical analysis. It begins by conducting a close replication of her results and
uncovers two statistical issues with the analysis. First, the main independent variable
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as well as three control variables are included as continuous items even though all of
them are categorical, and two, ethnic war and conflict aim, also exhibit no clear
rank-ordering. Second, the analysis includes a continuous variable indicating the
calendar year of the observation. This imposes the strong assumption on the data that
the baseline hazard of wartime rape monotonically increases, decreases, or stays
constant over time. However, neither theory nor the data support this assumption.
Addressing these two issues, both separately and together, while otherwise follow-
ing Loken in the choice of data, sample, and variables, results in substantively
different results: The presence of female rebel combatants is found to have a
negative and statistically significant effect on wartime rape.
In an extension, I link this result back to Loken’s organizational theory of
wartime rape by testing whether this effect is conditional on the group environment
female combatants operate in. In line with expectations derived from Loken’s argu-
ments, the effect is not moderated by rebel groups’ central command strength but
instead by their norms pertaining to gender. Group norms thus determine whether
women’s participation in rebel movements can affect rebel behavior and hence
decrease the extent of rape or whether they even participate in gang rapes to fit in
and not be victimized themselves. This conditional finding connects the results of
this note to studies documenting female rebel’s participation in rape and suggests
that combatant and organizational characteristics interact in driving rebels’ level
of rape.
The next section presents a short discussion of Loken’s argument, replicates the
analysis, and addresses the statistical issues therein, finding that female rebel com-
batants’ presence is associated with less wartime rape. Third section extends the
analysis to take organizational features into account, and fourth section concludes by
discussing the implications of these findings.
Replication: Female Rebels and Wartime Rape
Loken provides the first quantitative test of the notion that female combatants
decrease armed groups’ wartime rape. This theoretical conjecture rests on four
mechanisms, namely, that female combatants are more peaceful than their male
counterparts because they are women; that they are (willing or unwilling) sexual
partners for male combatants, thus substituting for civilian women; that the armed
groups they participate in have more feminist, anti-rape goals; and that their pres-
ence changes group socialization practices to become less misogynistic and hence
less supportive of sexual violence (Loken, 2017; E. J. Wood, 2009). Finding no
statistically significant effect of female combatants on wartime rape, Loken (2017)
contends that this is the case because “organizational cultures of militaries are often
replete with hypermasculine and misogynistic norms” and “women are subject to the
same organizational dogmatism as the men” (p. 83). In other words, she argues that
organizational, not individual factors drive wartime rape as group members are
socialized into a group top-down, leading to a null effect of combatant attributes
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such as gender. Notably, she suggests that this should be the case irrespective of
rebel groups’ strength of command because the pervasiveness of their misogynistic
norms (pp. 83–84). But as outlined above, these conclusions and their theoretical
implications contrast with much of the existing literature on armed group member-
ship, norms, and behavior.
This note takes this as a starting point to reexamine the empirical results reported
in Loken (2017), using the provided replication data set and starting with a recon-
struction of the article’s findings.2 This data set includes 983 conflict-year observa-
tions from 86 individual intrastate conflicts over the period 1980–2009 and is
described in more detail in Loken. In line with Loken, the dependent variable, rebel
wartime rape, is measured using an ordered categorical item that indicates how
intensely rebels used rape in a given year; ordered probit models are used to analyze
it and standard errors are clustered on the conflict to account for within-conflict
interdependencies. The main independent variable is an item measuring whether the
rebel combatants in a conflict included women; it is time-invariant and collected by
Loken. Finally, the replication begins with including all controls as done in Loken,
these are ethnic war, state failure, conflict aim, genocide, abduction, forced recruit-
ment, drugs, female labor force participation, polity, fertility rate, duration, popu-
lation (log), and year.
Model 1 in Table 1 presents the resulting close replication of Loken’s model
on rebel female combatants and wartime rape. The results are in line, if not
identical, with the original analysis in that the presence of female combatants
has a negative effect on wartime rape which, however, is not statistically sig-
nificant. Instead, various control variables are identified as significant predictors
of rape including state failure and conflict aim. These results mirror those in
Loken as well as in Cohen (2013a), upon which Loken’s analysis is based to a
large degree. However, a closer inspection reveals that both variables, as well as
ethnic war and female rebels, are categorical; their categories and distribution
are presented in Figure 1.3
Cohen includes state failure, ethnic war, and conflict aim in a continuous
manner; Loken follows her in this while also doing the same with female rebels.
By having these variables enter their models in a continuous fashion, both
studies assume that changes in these variables are monotonic and proportional.
In other words, they assume that, for example, a one-unit change from a conflict
over government to a conflict where rebels have ambiguous goals has the same
effect on rape as a one-unit change from such an ambiguous conflict to one
where rebels are fighting for secession. This monotonicity and proportionality of
effects is similarly assumed for the difference between nonethnic and ambiguous
conflicts and ambiguous and ethnic conflicts as well as the categories of female
rebels and state failure. While there may be theoretical reasons to make these
assumptions, these are spelled out in neither Cohen nor Loken. Including the
four variables as continuous items may thus give rise to bias through functional






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































form misspecification, assuming a linear relationship between categories where
there is none (Wooldridge, 2013, p.294).
Models 2–5 in Table 1 thus one-by-one separate these items into factor variables
instead, that is, include a dummy for each but their respective lowest category which
is accordingly taken as baseline (Wooldridge, 2013, p.228). The results support
scepticism over the variables’ linear inclusion as none appears to have a linear effect
on wartime rape; instead, Category 1 of state failure, regime change, is found to
decrease the probability of rebels engaging in rape as compared to no state failure
while complete collapse has a positive effect. Similarly, rebels fighting over gov-
ernment appear somewhat less likely to rape than rebels with ambiguous aims but
more likely than secessionist rebels. Notably, Model 5 also indicates that the pres-
ence of female rebels decreases wartime rape. Both groups with moderate and high
numbers of women are found to be less likely to engage in higher levels of rape once
the assumption that conflict aim has a monotonic and proportional effect on rape is
Figure 1. Categorical independent variables. Note. Histograms of female rebels, ethnic war,
state failure, and conflict aim.
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relaxed. In line with the original study, this effect is thus found to be negative, but
here it is also statistically distinguishable from zero.
Models 2–5 follow the original analysis in Loken and Cohen by including the
variable year to “capture whether time is a significant factor, either because mea-
surement is improving over time or wartime rape is getting worse” (Cohen, 2013a,
p. 469). More specifically, this variable indicates in which year a given observation
took place and enters the model as a continuous item in both Cohen (2013a) and
Loken. As with the previously discussed continuous treatment of categorical vari-
ables, this implies a strong assumption in terms of functional form. Including year in
a linear fashion only allows for a baseline hazard of rape that is either constant or
monotonically increases or decreases. Cohen (2013a, p. 469) argues that this may be
the case due to improved measurement or wartime rape becoming more common.
However, the available data do not suggest that rape has gotten more prevalent over
time. Figure 2 graphs year against wartime rape showing that while earlier observa-
tions are more likely to have no reported acts of rape, there is little difference in the
temporal distribution of Categories 1–3 of wartime rape. There is thus little evidence
for a linear, monotonic time trend to support the strong assumption made by includ-
ing year in a linear fashion.
This is especially relevant as there are other, more flexible methods of taking time
trends into account. Accordingly, Model 6 uses year splines4 instead of the
linear year variable, allowing the baseline hazard of rape to nonlinearly vary with
time. In line with Model 5, the effect of female combatants’ participation on rebel
groups’ level of rape is again negative and statistically significant in Model 6.5
Figure 2. Wartime rape and year. Note. Gray areas represent probability density, spikes
denote adjacent values, boxes indicate interquartile ranges, and white dots give the medians.
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At the same time, it should be noted that while these changes in model specification
alter the effect of female rebel combatants being present on rape, thus contradicting
the results presented in Loken (2017), the other results remain consistent with Cohen
(2013a) as rebels’ use of abduction continues to have a positive and statistically
significant effect on their use of wartime rape.
To get a more substantive understanding of the negative effect of women parti-
cipating in rebel groups, Figure 3 presents how the probability of each of the
outcome values of wartime rape changes with the presence of female rebel comba-
tants in Model 6, the model including all corrections. Here, two effects of female
rebels, for moderate and for high participation, are shown. However, the confidence
intervals of these variables almost completely overlap for all outcome categories,
suggesting that while organizations that include no women behave differently from
both, there is little difference between them.6 In terms of their substantive effects,
Figure 3 indicates that groups including women as combatants are 10.4–16.4
percentage points more likely to engage in no rape at all. In contrast, the presence
of female combatants decreases the probability that rebels engage in sporadic, wide-
spread, or systematic rape by 2.8–7.1 percentage points. All these effects are also
statistically distinguishable from zero, suggesting that the presence of female com-
batants has a statistically and substantively significant effect on the use of rape by
rebel organizations.
In the Online Appendix, I show that this result also holds up when accounting for
time dependence within and possible heterogeneity across units, including
year-fixed effects, using matching or a multinomial logit model, and when restrict-
ing the sample to a pure cross section of conflicts.
Figure 3. Female rebels and wartime rape. Note. Figure presents the marginal effect of
switching female combatants from zero to either moderate or high levels on each of the
outcome values of wartime rape based on Model 6. Dots give point estimates while whiskers
represent 90% confidence intervals.
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Extension: Female Rebels, Organizational Features,
and Wartime Rape
In summary, these results do not support the argument that the participation of
female combatants does not decrease rape. In other words, individual combatants
being women affects group behavior which in turn is not completely determined by
organizational features. However, the effect of individual combatant attributes such
as gender may still depend on the organizational context in which these individuals
operate. This section thus links the effect of female combatants on rape back to two
factors that play a prominent role in Loken’s organizational role of wartime rape,
rebel groups’ strength of command, and their misogynistic norms. Loken argues that
misogynistic norms in rebel groups are so strong that their effect is pervasive and
irrespective of central command’s level of authority. As a result, the latter should
have little effect on whether female combatants can deviate from group orders
regarding rape. In contrast, it should be the nature of group norms that determines
to what extent women participating in rebel movements can affect group behavior
and hence the extent of rape. Where these norms are especially misogynistic, female
rebels may participate in gang rapes to fit in and not become victims themselves
(Cohen, 2013b). Whereas if norms are less misogynistic, they may use this as an
opportunity to challenge group behavior and strive for more gender equality both
within and outside the group. Given Loken’s organizational theory of wartime rape,
it should thus be expected that how female combatants affect rape is not moderated
by rebels’ strength of command but instead by their gender norms.
This section extends Loken’s analysis by testing the effect of female rebel partic-
ipation on rape conditional on rebel group command strength and norms. To measure
the former, I employ an ordinal variable command strength which is taken from the
Non-State Actor Data, version 3.4 (Cunningham et al., 2013). Measuring group norms
is less straightforward as they are unobservable, I use a dummy indicating whether
rebels include female commanders in their leadership as a proxy (Henshaw et al.,
2019). Group commanders should have a clear influence on group norms as they are in
a position to directly institute them through training and threats as well as sanction
their breaches as they seek to direct the use of violence (Hoover Green, 2016; E. J.
Wood, 2018). If commanders are women, norms should be somewhat less misogy-
nistic as a result. Additionally, women being in commanding positions can already be
viewed as a signal that group norms are not very misogynistic given that their presence
implies male rank-and-file being subordinate to and having to follow the orders of
women. For instance, the Kurdish forces in Syria include numerous women among
their commanders and have been documented to exhibit gender-equal group norms as
well as policies that explicitly guarantee women’s rights (Szekely, 2019). I thus
replicate Model 6 while respectively adding the command strength and female com-
manders items and interacting them with female rebels.
Given that the middle category of female rebels consists of observations from
only three conflicts, I binarize this measure; substantive results however remain
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unchanged when using the original, ordinal version. The substantive results of these
extended models are presented in Figures 4 and 5.7 In line with Loken’s claims,
Figure 4 presents no clear evidence that group command strength moderates the
effect of female rebel membership on rape. Women’s presence is found to make the
nonoccurrence of rape 20 percentage points more likely in groups with a strong
central command but also 16 percentage points more likely in groups where central
command is weak. Similarly, the probability of rape being common is decreased by
8.2 percentage points when women fight for a group and its central command is
weak whereas that decrease is 9.9 percentage points if the group has a strong central
command instead. All these effects are also statistically distinguishable from zero,
suggesting that the participation of women decreases wartime rape both in groups
with low and high levels of central command strength.
In contrast, Figure 5 suggests that group’s gender norms, as proxied by having
women in leadership positions, moderate the effect of female combatants being
present on wartime rape. Where women have access to commanding positions,
female combatants’ participation is found to decrease the probability of rape
by 14.7 percentage points; where they do not, this effect decreases to
6.2 percentage points and is statistically insignificant. Similarly, the presence of
female combatants decreases the probability of groups with women in leadership
positions engaging in isolated or common levels of wartime rape by 4.6 and
7.3 percentage points; there is again no statistically significant effect when there are
no women in the group leadership and hence more misogynistic group norms. These
results thus provide suggestive evidence in support of Loken’s argument that group
culture matters as misogynistic norms prove so pervasive as to erase any
rape-decreasing effect the presence of female combatants might otherwise have.
Figure 4. Female rebels, command strength, and wartime rape. Note. Figure presents the
marginal effect of switching female combatants from zero to one on each of the outcome
values of wartime rape based on the Online Appendix Model A.12. Dots give point estimates
while whiskers represent 90% confidence intervals.
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In contrast, less misogynistic norms provide space for women to affect group behavior
and hence decrease rape levels. This suggests that the overall finding that female
combatants being present is associated with a decrease in rape is mainly driven by less
misogynistic groups. At the same time, this conditional effect also provides an impor-
tant linkage from this overall finding to studies documenting women’s participation in
gang rapes as members of highly misogynistic groups (Cohen, 2013b).
Taken together, these results suggest that the originally found null effect of women
participating in rebel groups on the wartime use of rape can be attributed to the strong
functional form assumptions imposed on some of the control variables by having them
enter the model in a linear fashion. Once one relaxes these assumptions by including
categorical items such as conflict aim as factor variables and allowing a
non-monotonic baseline hazard of rape, the evidence presented here supports the idea
that conflict-related sexual violence decreases in the presence of female rebel comba-
tants. However, further analyses also provide support for Loken’s organizational
theory of wartime rape as the effect of female combatants’ participation is moderated
by group gender norms. The participation of female rebels is only associated with a
lower probability of rape in organizations where norms afford them the space to affect
group behavior, whereas there is no such effect on rape when group norms are mis-
ogynistic and female combatants participate in rape to fit in.
Conclusion
This article reconsiders how the participation of women in rebel groups affects
wartime rape, finding support for the notion that rebel groups which include women
as fighters are less prone to commit acts of conflict-related sexual violence than
Figure 5. Female rebels, female commanders, and wartime rape. Note. Figure presents the
marginal effect of switching female combatants from zero to one on each of the outcome
values of wartime rape based on the Online Appendix Model A.13. Dots give point estimates
while whiskers represent 90% confidence intervals.
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strictly male groups. This conclusion differs from Loken’s, and this article shows
that this is due to strong and problematic assumptions in the specification of her
analysis. In short, all independent variables enter the model in a continuous fashion
there, including categorical ones with more than two outcome categories and a
variable indicating the year of the observation, thus restricting their effect on war-
time rape to be linear. However, there is little theoretical and empirical support for
the assumptions that rape increases linearly from rebel groups who fight over gov-
ernment to groups that have ambiguous goals to groups who aim to achieve seces-
sion or that the baseline hazard of rape is either flat or monotonically changing with
time. The analysis in this article thus closely replicates Loken’s models, using the
same data, variables, and observations, while allowing the effects of multicatego-
rical variables and of time to be nonlinear. Results provide support for the idea that
the presence of female rebel combatants decreases wartime rape. However, the
results of an extension of Loken’s analysis also offer support for her organizational
theory of rape as the presence of female combatants is found to reduce rape only for
groups without misogynistic gender norms. These findings suggest that individual
combatant and group attributes interact in shaping rebel organizations’ level of rape.
First and foremost, this research thus adds to the literature on the drivers and
effects of female participation in rebel groups. Future studies should examine this
phenomenon further by, for example, studying group-level data or even seeking
microlevel data on the participation of women in rebel fighting units to examine
how it affects these units’ behavior as compared to homogeneously male units. And,
perhaps even more importantly, they should further develop the theoretical under-
pinnings of why such an effect may be the case, especially as combatant and orga-
nizational attributes interact in how they influence outcomes such as sexual violence
and the victimization of civilians. More generally, this research serves as a reminder
that when specifying independent variables in parametric regression models, impli-
cit functional form assumptions can and do matter. It illustrates that including multi-
categorical variables in a linear fashion can severely change the results one obtains,
especially if these variables are not rank-ordered. At the same time, it serves as
another reminder that it not only matters whether potential effects of time are
accounted for but also how this is done. As shown prominently in the context of
binary dependent variables, it can only be the first step to realize that one needs to
account for time dependence, the second step should be to do so in a flexible manner
that imposes no strong, unintended functional form assumptions (Carter & Sign-
orino, 2010). The results on the relationship between female combatants and war-
time rape presented here serve as an example for how such assumptions can impact
substantive conclusions.
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Notes
1. See, for example, Braithwaite & Ruiz (2018) and R. M. Wood (2019). Out of these studies,
Loken has been cited most often and has received attention outside of political science
(e.g., McDermott, 2020).
2. The replication data set is available from Loken’s website. This is a corrected data set as
some errors were found in the one used in the original article. This analysis uses the
corrected data set, and results should be compared to those presented in the corresponding
correction (Loken, n.d.).
3. See the appendix of Cohen (2013a) for detailed variable descriptions.
4. These are restricted cubic splines with five knots, placed at the 5th, 27.5th, 50th, 72.5th,
and 95th percentiles (Harrell, 2015). Results remain substantively identical if alternative
knot numbers are used.
5. In the Online Appendix, Model 6 is replicated using year-fixed effects and results are
substantively identical. Female rebels also achieves statistical significance when using
year-fixed effects while including all categorical variables in a linear fashion.
6. As presented in Figure 1, there are few observations in the moderate category, all of which
come from Myanmar (30), Guatemala (17), and Nicaragua (8). This lack of a difference is
reassuring as it implies that the decision to include a middle category for three conflicts
does not drive results.
7. A full results table is presented in the Online Appendix.
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